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An Alternative Approach to the
Good Faith Controversy
by Ronald J. Bacigal*
The current debate over the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule has often been cast in very narrow terms. The present controversy
often isolates the exclusionary rule from the remaining body of fourth
amendment law and centers upon the question of whether the exclusionary rule· should, in theory, and can, in practice, deter good faith mistakes.
The 'practical' question of deterrence cannot be answered because of the
lack of empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule. 1 A
definitive answer to the 'theoretical' question has undesirable repercussions because adoption of an overly broad good faith exception appears to
reward ignorance,• while rejection of all forms of good faith offers no incentive to the police to make their best effort to comply with the fourth
amendment.
United States v. Leon8 and Massachusetts v. Sheppard• are very limited adoptions of the good faith exception, but their language and analysis sow the seeds for a rapid and broad expansion of the exception.'
Before the Supreme Court moves too rapidly toward acceptance of good
faith in all search and seizure cases, it might be wise to pause and consider an alternative approach that stops short of a complete endorsement
of police good faith. This Article examines the role of police motivation in
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond. Concord College (B.S., 1964); Washington & Lee University (LL.B., 1967).
1. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the
"Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests,
1983 AB.F. R&s. J. 611.
2. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365 (1981-82).
3. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
4. 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984).
5. United States v. Leon and Massachusetts v. Sheppard apply the good faith exception
to searches pursuant to a warrant. The next question for the Court will be whether to extend the good faith exception to warrantless searches.
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all facets of fourth amendment jurisprudence and demonstrates that the
Court has often considered good faith as one relevant but ill-defined factor in determining substantive aspects of the fourth amendment. The Article concludes that this ambiguous and flexible approach to substantive
fourth amendment rights should be utilized when applying the remedy of
exclusion.8
I.

POLICE MOTIVATION AND 'SUBSTANTIVE' FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW

While the good faith exception is subject to valid criticism,7 it may not
be accurate to characterize the exception as an unprecedented concept
designed to gut the exclusionary rule. Depending upon the definition of
good faith, there may be considerable fourth amendment precedent for
recognizing the motivation underlying a search. When defining a good
faith exception, its proponents have not contended that a police officer's
irrational motivation can justify a search so long as the officer is pure of
heart. No. one would seriously contend that a misguided but sincere officer could break into dwellings and seize matches and cigarette lighters
as part of his plan to eliminate marijuana smoking. The good faith exception as adopted in United States u. Leon requires objectively reasonable
efforts to comply with the fourth amendment. 8 This concept of reasonable good faith can be integrated into the larger body of fourth amendment jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court's current 'balancing' approach to determination of
reasonable searches is an extremely nebulous and open-ended standard,8
that could take cognizance of reasonable good faith. Under this approach,
the Court balances reasonable efforts (objective good faith) to accomplish
reasonable societal goals against reasonable expectations of privacy in order to determine the constitutional standard for reasonable searches.
Thus, if motivation is defined to encompass the objective reasonableness
of the searching officer's purpose,1° there are existing Supreme Court de6. See infra text accompanying note 166.
7. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 2; Schlag, Assaults on the Exclusionary
Rule: Good Faith Limitations and Damage Remedies, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 875
(1982); White, Forgotten Points in the "Exclusionary Rule" Debate, 81 M1cH. L. REV. 1273
(1983) ..
8. 104 S. Ct. at 3420 n.20. Leon emphasized that the good faith exception is grounded
on an objective standard and not on the subjective good faith of individual officers.
9. See infra text accompanying note 64.
10. This Article uses 'motivation' and 'purpose' as functionally synonymous terms, both
referring to the goals police officers or government agents seek to accomplish. Efforts to
draw meaningful distinctions between motivation and purpose have not been productive.
See generally, A Colloquium on Legislatiue Motivation, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925-1183
(1978).
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cisions which suggest that motivation or purpose is relevant, not only to
the operation of the exclusionary rule, but also with respect to other major areas of fourth amendment law.11
At its most fundamental level, the fourth amendment seeks to protect
individual privacy and to regulate the exercise of certain governmental
power. 111 The Supreme Court has recently emphasized the privacy aspects
of the amendment, 18 but has neglected to address regulation of police
conduct because of the Court's dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule.
Criticism of the exclusionary rule should not confuse the procedural device of excluding evidence with the substantive goal of controlling police
conduct. Regulating the police is not. merely a means to accomplish the
ends of the fourth amendment. Control of the police is itself a proper goal
of the amendment. 14 Controlling police misconduct through the procedural device of the exclusionary rule necessitates an examination of the
substantive distinction between misconduct and police conduct that is
proper under the fourth amendment. At this point motivation becomes
relevant to substantive aspects of the amendment as well as to the remedy of exclusion. u
History reveals that the framers of the fourth amendment were primarily concerned with police conduct that was arbitrary and capricious. 111 The
use and misuse of general warrants and writs of assistance is recognized
11. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). According to Justice White, the discussion of
probable cause in Gates "is itself but a variation on the good-faith theme." Id. at 250
(White, J., concurring).
12. See generally Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
Rsv. 349 (1974); Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature of the Fourth
Amendment, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 529 (1978).
13. In Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747-48 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) and Segura
v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984), the Court distinguished between searches, that
threaten privacy interests, and seizures, that 'merely' infringe upon property rights.
14. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) is a prime example of utilizing the fourth
amendment to regulate police conduct even when the privacy interests involved are relatively minor. The intrusion upon privacy in Prouse (stopping an automobile for a registration check) was slight, and had the court chosen to determine reasonableness by use of the
balancing process, this minor intrusion upon privacy could easily have been subordinated to
the 'weighty' interest in motor vehicle safety. Rather than focus on privacy interests, the
court chose to emphasize the need to control a potentially arbitrary exercise of police power.
Id. at 661.
15. See infra text accompanying note 163.
16. "The historical judgment, which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed
executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and
overlook potential invasions of privacy . . . ." United States v. United States Dist. Court,
407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972). In McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), the Court
observed: "Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their own
cannot be trusted." Id. at 456.
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as one of the prime causes of the American Revolution. 17 These instruments gave such unfettered power to law enforcement officers that, in the
words of James Otis, they placed " 'the liberty of every man in the hands
of every petty officer.' " 19 Security against arbitrary police intrusions is a
basic tenet of a free society and lies at the heart of the fourth amendment.1• The constitutional framers thus sought to control police power by
proscribing certain conduct (unreasonable searches) and by prescribing
the proper manner of conducting lawful searches (the specific commands
of the warrant clause).10
When interpreting both the proscriptions and prescriptions of the
fourth amendment, the Court, at times, has found police motivation to be
a relevant consideration. This Article examines the role that police motivation has played in determining: (1) The scope of the amendment;11 (2)
the requirement of probable cause;11 (3) the applicability of the warrant
requirement;18 (4) the manner of executing a search;" and (5) third party
consent. 111

A. Motivation and the Scope of the Fourth Amendment
In Frank v. Maryland, 18 the Court defined the scope of the fourth
17. See generally Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution, in THE
ERA OF THE A.MmucAN R.EvoLUTION 40 (R. Morris ed. 1939).
18. 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 142 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965) (quoting James

Otis).
19. The major historical studies of the fourth amendment begin their analysis of colonial
searches and seizures with James Otis' famous challenge of the Writs of Assistance in Paxton's Case in 1761. See J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME CouRT (1966);
N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATBS CONSTITUTION {Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science
Series 55, No. 2, 1937); T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES 1N CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1969).
For a brief examination of colonial. searches and seizures in the period of 1661-1764, see
Bacigal, A Case For Jury Determination of Search and Seizure Law, 15 U. Rica. L. R.Ev.
791, 794-806 (1981).
20. The Supreme Court has been engaged in a long-standing controversy over the rela-

tionship of the reasonableness clause and the warrant clause. See the majority and dissenting opinions in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (overruled in Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969)). The relationship between these two clauses need not
be resolved in this Article because police motivation ill relevant when interpreting the specific commands of the warrant clause and when applying the general rubric of reasonableness. See infra text accompanying note 64.
21. See infra text accompanying note 26.
22. See infra text accompanying note 64.
23. See infra text accompanying note 93.
24. See infra text accompanying note 120.
25. See infra text accompanying note 153.
26. 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (overruled in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-34
(1967)).
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amendment by reference to the governmental motivation that prompted
the search. The Court in Frank viewed the fourth amendment as primarily concerned with searches for evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution, but did not view inspections for violations of a health code to be
searches within the meaning of the amendment. 17 Under Frank v. Maryland, the constitutionality of the government's conduct turned upon the
motivation of the searching agents.18 If the agents' purpose was to obtain
evidence for a criminal prosecution, then their action was a search and
the fourth amendment was applicable.119 If the government agents' purpose was unrelated to a criminal prosecution, then their action was not a
search, and the fourth amendment was inapplicable. ao
Root v. Gauper8 1 illustrates how a factual determination of police motivation can decide the applicability of the fourth amendment. 31 In Root,
the victim telephoned an operator saying that he had been shot and
·needed an ambulance.•• The operator connected the victim with an ambulance driver who in turn notified the town marshall. The ambulance
driver proceeded to the victim's house and radioed the marshall that he
was transporting the victim to the hospital. 84 The marshall arrived at the
victim's home and waited for the. sheriff to arrive. The two officers then
entered and seized items which were subsequently offered in evidence. 86
After holding that the police intrusion could not be justified on grounds
of consent or plain view, the court considered the applicability of the
27. 359 U.S. at 365-67.
28. If the police conduct is not designated a "search," the fourth amendment is inapplicable, and "the law does not give a constitutional damn" about whether the police conduct
complied with any of the provisions of the amendment. Moylan, The Fourth Amendment
Inapplicable us. The Fourth Amendment Satisfied: The Neglected Threshold of "So
What?" 1977 S. ILL. U.L.J. 75, 76.
29. "A search implies an examination of one's premises or person with a view to the
discovery of contraband or evidence of guilt to be used in prosecution of a criminal action."
Haerr v. United States, 240 F.2d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 1957).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Gravitt, 484 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1135 (1974), in which the court upheld an inventory search of an automobile because
the purpose of the intrusion was:
the police interest in protecting the property of the accused and in protecting
themselves. It was not an interest in gathering euidence, such as seizing contraband or dangerous weapons. That is usually involved when a search is made on
the basis of a warrant or on grounds that there exists probable cause combined
with exigent circumstances. Where interests of the former kind are involved, it is
of course of no consequence whether or not there was probable cause.
484 F.2d at 380 n.5 (emphasis added).
31. 438 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1971).
32. Id. at 364.
33. Id. at 363.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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emergency doctrine. 36 The court recognized that "police officers may
enter a dwelling without a warrant to render emergency aid and assistance to a person whom they reasonably believe to be in distress and in
need of that assistance."37 Applying an "objective standard as to the reasonableness of the officer's belief,"86 the court found that the knowledge
that the victim had been removed, and the fact that the marshall waited
for the sheriff rather than entering immediately, were not consistent with
a motive to assist an injured person.36 Instead, the facts suggested "that
the purpose of entering the house was to obtain evidence relating to the
commission of the crime."'0 Thus, once the court factually ascertained
the purpose of the intrusion, the applicability of the fourth amendment
was automatically determined. 41
The Frank v. Maryland distinction between 'searches' motivated by
the desire to obtain incriminating evidence, and 'intrusions' motivated by
a desire to accomplish other purposes was overruled in Camara v. Municipal Court,41 in which the Supreine Court stated: "It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected
of criminal behavior."" The court in Camara emphasized that an intrusion upon privacy is the proper test for defining the scope of the fourth
amendment, and that the underlying governmental motivation for the intrusion is largely irrelevant when determining the amendment's scope."
Camara has not, however, remained unchallenged. The Court qualified its
position on governmental motivation in the subsequent cases of Harris v.
United States' 11 and Wyman v. James.' 6
In Harris, the Court approved the "precise and detailed findings of the
District Court, accepted by the Court of Appeals . . . to the effect that
the discovery of the ... [seized item] was not the result of a search of
the car, but of a measure taken to protect the car while it was in police
36. Id. at 363-65. See generally Bacigal, The Emergency Exception to the Fourth
Amendment, 9 U. Rieu. L. REV. 249 (1975).
37. 438 F.2d at 364.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 365.
40. Id.
41. Id. See also United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 943 (1974).
42. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
43. Id. at 530.
44. Id. at 534-35. See also United States v. Resnick, 455 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1008 (1973). "[T]he scope of the Fourth Amendment is not determined by
the subjective conclusion of the law enforcement officer." 455 F.2d at 1132.
45. 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
46. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
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custody.""1 The Court in Harris thus upheld the intrusion into the automobile because the police were not motivated by a desire to obtain incriminating evidence, but were seeking only to protect themselves from
civil liability for the mishandling of private property."' Harris is in direct
conflict with Camara in considering the relevance of police motivation,
although the subsequent holding in South Dakota v. Opperman" 9 may
have repudiated Harris. The Supreme Court, however, has never repudiated its discussion of governmental motivation in Wyman v. James. 10
In Wyman, Mrs. James, a welfare mother was notified that, pursuant to
state law, welfare workers were to visit her home.11 Mrs. James refused to
grant permission to enter her home and was notified that such refusal
would result in the termination of all welfare assistance.12 When Mrs.
James filed a civil rights suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, the
first issue before the Court was whether home visits by welfare workers
constituted searches under the fourth amendment. 18 The lower court had
not considered the question of governmental .motivation, but held that
"[a]ny unauthorized physical penetration into the premises occupied by
plaintiff is a search."" The Supreme Court paid homage to the tradition
of jealous protection of fourth amendment rights, but then declared the
tradition irrelevant to the facts of Wyman "for the seemingly obvious and
simple reason that we are not concerned here with any search . . . in the
Fourth Amendment meaning of that term.''" Although the Court recognized the possibility that a 'visit' by welfare officials could uncover evidence of fraud and lead to a possible criminal prosecution, the Court held
that the prime purpose of the visit was not investigative in a criminal
sense.16 "It is ... true that the caseworker's posture ... is perhaps, in a
sense, both rehabilitative and investigative. But this latter aspect, we
think, is given too broad a character and far more emphasis than it deserves if it is equated with a search in the traditional criminal law
47. 390 U.S. at 236.
48. Id.
49. 428 U.S. 364 (1976). See infra text accompanying note 104.
50. 400 U.S. at 309.
51. Id. at 313-14.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 314-16. The Court held that the 'visits' were not searches under the fourth
amendment. Id. at 323-24. The Court held in the alternative that if the visits were searches,
they were nonetheless reasonable under the fourth amendment. Id. at 326. For a discussion
of the alternative holding, see infra text accompanying note 73.
54. James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935, 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), rev'd sub nom. Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). The district court went on to hold that "[l]ike most of the Bill
of Rights, the Fourth Amendment was not designed to be a shelter for criminals, but a basic
protection for everyone." 303 F. Supp. at 941.
55. 400 U.S. at 317.
56. Id. at 323.
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context."67
A search 'in the traditional criminal law context' is a quest for incriminating evidence.&11 Under the holding of Wyman, a government intrusion
for a purpose other than criminal investigation is simply not a search, and
the fourth amendment is totally inapplicable. 119 The purpose behind the
intrusion may be a 'noble' community interest (e.g., public welfare) as in
Wyman, or it may be a very narrow interest as in Harris v. United States
(e.g., protecting the police from civil liability for the mishandling of private property). Wyman and Harris indicate that it is not necessary to
characterize the purpose of the intrusion as noble or as serving broad
community interest. The important factor is to characterize the motivation as other than a quest for incriminating evidence. Once the intrusion
is so characterized, the fourth amendment is deemed inapplicable.
The relevance of police motivation in determining the scope of the
fourth amendment reached its apex in Frank v. Maryland.8° and has been
followed by a general retreat with some exceptions. By emphasizing the
privacy aspects of the fourth amendment, the subsequent holdings in
Camara61 and Katz v. United States61 suggested that police motivation
was largely immaterial in defining the scope of the amendment. The exceptions, however, such as Wyman and Harris, indicate that while governmental motivation may no longer be the sole determinative factor,
governmental motivation continues to play some role in defining the applicability of the fourth amendment. The lower courts continue to consider police motivation and sometimes distinguish between a fourth
amendment search and a civil intrusion upon the basis of that
motivaiion.88
B. Police Motivation and the Requirements of Probable Cause or
Reasonableness
The fourth amendment consists of two conjunctive clauses: the reasonableness clause, which protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures, and the warrant clause, which prescribes conditions for the issuance of a warrant.114 The proper relationship between these two clauses
57. Id. at 317 (emphasis added).
58. See supra text accompanying note 26.
59. 400 U.S. at 326.
60. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
61. 387 U.S. at 528.
62. 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967).
63. See generally Bacigal, supra note 36.
64. The fourth amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-

1986)

GOOD FAJTH CONTROVERSY

965

has been the subject of much debate centering on whether the clauses a.re
dependent or independent of each other. One view holds that reasonableness is the ultimate standard for a search and "there can be no ready test
for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to
search against the invasion which the search entails.',.6 The other view
holds that balancing to determine reasonableness is the exception and
that the warrant clause standard of probable cause is the general rule for
determining the constitutionality of searches."
The two views shade into each other when the Court defines reasonableness by looking to the warrant clause and defines the probable cause
requirement of the warrant clause by looking back to the reasonableness
clause. 67 With the Court's recognition of a 'sliding scale' of probable
cause,68 police motivation is relevant under either the reasonableness
standard or the probable cause standard. In applying either standard, the
Court balances the government's purpose in searching against the intrusion upon privacy. Thus, "it would seem to make no difference in terms
of outcome whether the balancing is done merely to determine what is
reasonable or to determine what level of probable cause is required.''H
Whether the balancing is done under the reasonableness or probable
cause standard, the purpose (motivation) of the police must first be identified and accorded weight before the balancing can occur. For example,
the motivation to save lives is accorded more weight than the motivation
to obtain incriminating evidence and will thus affect the outcome of the
balancing process. In acknowledging the relevance of police motivation,
Justice Jackson observed:
If we assume, for example, that a child is kidnaped and the officers throw
a roadblock about the neighborhood and search every outgoing car, it
would be a drastic and undiscriminating use of the search. The officers
might be unable to show probable cause for searching any particular car.
However, I should candidly strive hard to sustain such an action, executed fairly and in good faith, because it might be reasonable to subject
travelers to that indignity if it was the only way to save a threatened life
and detect a vicious crime. But I should not strain to sustain such a
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.
65. 387 U.S. at 536-37.
66. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208-14 (1979).
67. "In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant to search be obtained, 'probable cause' is the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested
against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness." 387 U.S. at 534.
68. See Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment in Flux:: The Rise and Fall of Probable
Cause, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 763.
69. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REv. 40, 56 n.86 (1968).

966

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

roadblock and universal search to salvage a few bottles of bourbon and
catch a bootlegger.70

The Court also recognized the relevance of governmental motivation in
Wyman v. James. 71 Although the primary holding of Wyman was that
the noncriminal purpose of the intrusion made it a 'nonsearch,'711 the
Court also noted that, if the intrusion is deemed to be a search, it is not
unconstitutional because it "does not descend to the level of unreasonableness."78 The Wyman opinion listed eleven factors that led the Court to
conclude that the search was not unreasonable.14 These factors essentially
consist of the noncriminal interests served by such intrusions. 711 Thus, in
an alternative holding, the Court i~ Wyman recognized the motivation
underlying a search as one factor in determining its reasonableness. 78
More directly on point is Cady v. Dombrowski,11 in which the Court
upheld a warrantless search on the ground that the motivation of the police was to perform "community caretaking functions, totally divorced
from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to
the violation of a criminal estatute."78 Dombrowski concerned the arrest
of an off-duty policeman for driving while intoxicated. The car he was
driving was towed to a garage, and the police inventoried the automobile
in order to remove the police revolver defendant was believed to have
been carrying.7' In the process, the police discovered blood-stained objects that led to defendant's conviction for murder.80 The Court took note
70. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). See also
People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 303 P.2d 721 (1956). "Necessity often justifies an action
... where the act is prompted by the motive of preserving life or property . . . ." 47 Cal.
2d at 377, 303 P.2d at 723. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court recognized the
need to protect the physical safety of police and noted: "We are now concerned with more
than the governmental interest in investigating crime ...." 392 U.S. at 23 (emphasis
added). For suggestions that the severity of the crime is an appropriate factor in the balancing process, see Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth Amendment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara, 61 CALIF. L. REv.
1011, 1040 (1973).
71. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
72. Id. at 317-18.
73. Id. at 318.
74. Id. at 318-24.
75. For example, "The public's interest in ... assistance to the unfortunate . . . ." Id.
at 318; "The visit is not one by police or uniformed authority." Id. at 322; "[T]he [welfare]
program concerns dependent children and the needy families of those children. It does not
deal with crime or with the actual or suspected perpetrators of crime." Id. at 323; "The
home visit is not a criminal investigation .•.." Id.
76. Id. at 318-19.
77. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
78. Id. at 441.
79. Id. at 436-37.
80. Id. at 437-39.
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of the 'specific motivation' of the intruding officer, which was "concern
for the safety of the general public who might be endangered if an intruder removed a revolver from the trunk of the vehicle,"81 and held that
this purpose justified the search as constitutionally reasonable.81
Jus~ how far police motivation can go in reducing the required level of
probable cause was illustrated in People v. Sirhan.88 The government action in Sirhan, a warrantless search of a private dwelling and seizure of a
personal diary, intruded upon interests that society generally considers
intimately private." Balanced against these interests was the desire of the
police to dispel the potential panic that could follow a political assassination. 86 The Supreme Court of California held the search and seizure to be
reasonable because:
The crime was one of enormous gravity, and the "gravity of the offense"
is an appropriate factor to take into consideration . . . . The victim was
a major presidential candidate, and a crime of violence had already been
committed against him. The crime thus involved far more than possibly
idle threats. Although the officers did not have reasonable cause to believe that the house contained evidence of a conspiracy to assassinate
prominent political leaders, we believe that the mere possibility that
there might be such evidence in the house fully warranted the officers'
actions. It is not difficult to envisage what would have been the effect on
this nation if several more political assassinations had followed that of
Senator Kennedy. 86

The possible police motives for intruding upon privacy are infinitely
diverse. In noncriminal situations, the motives can range from control of
political demonstrations87 to protecting underprivileged children.88 Police
motivation in traditional criminal law searches can range from checking
for violation of automobile registratidn laws89 to apprehending vicious
murderers.80 Although individual justices have cautioned us "to be most
81. Id. at 447.
82. Id. at 448.
83. 7 Cal. 3d 710, 497 P.2d 1121, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 947
(1973).
84. 7 Cal. 3d at 736, 497 P.2d at 1138, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
85. Id. at 737-39, 497 P.2d at 1139-40, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 403-04.
86. Id. at 739, 497 P.2d at 1140, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 404 (citations omitted).
87. In Donohoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Va. 1971), aff'd 465 F.2d 196 (4th Cir.
1972), the court stated: "It has long been the policy in Richmond and other places
throughout the nation to photograph persons participating in vigils, demonstrations, protests and other like activities whether peaceful or otherwise." 330 F. Supp. at 309.
88. Wyman, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
89. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
90. See Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 497 P.2d 1121, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 947 (1973). But cf. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), in which the Court rejected
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on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent, "111 the courts have often considered police motivation when determining the reasonableness of a search.112
C. Police Motivation and the Warrant Requirement

The probable cause or reasonableness standards, in theory and in fact,
may be flexible enough to take account of police motivation. A court must
balance the right to privacy against other legitimate interests, and it may
strike the balance at different points, depending upon the governmental
motivation underlying the search, for example, the desire to save lives
versus the desire to obtain incriminating evidence. The same need for
flexibility is not so apparent, however, with respect to the warrant requirement. Its function is not to balance conflicting interests, but to serve
as a limitation of police power by providing a procedure which assures
that the judiciary performs the balancing of interests.93 When police bypass the magistrate and conduct a warrantless search they usurp the judicial function of determining when the right of privacy can be set aside.
The courts should be jealous of this power and skeptical of the need of
police to exercise such power. Thus, the warrant requirement should remain a strict requirement and should not be bypassed solely because of a
benevolent motive of the police conducting the search.
Of course, the warrant requirement is not absolute and the Supreme
Court has long recognized a 1,1umber of exceptions to the warrant requirement... In the words of Camara,115 the warrant procedure may be bypassed whenever "the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate
the governmental purpose behind the search. " 96 In determining whether
the warrant requirement would frustrate the purpose of the search, the
lower courts have traditionally considered three factors: (1) the time required to obtain a warrant;117 (2) the time required to frustrate the search
a 'murder scene' exception to the warrant requirement. 437 U.S. at 395.
91. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (overruled in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967)).
92. See, e.g., Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1966), in which the court held that
probable cause requires only "some basis from which the court can determine that the [intrusion] was not arbitrary or harrassing." Id. at 415.
93. The protection of the warrant clause "consists in requiring that those inferences
[concerning probable cause] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
94. See Haddad, Well-Delineated Ex.ceptions, Claims of Sham, and Fourfold Probable
Couse, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198 (1977).
95. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
96. Id. at 533.
97. See, e.g., Shepard v. State, 319 So. 2d 127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (considering
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by destroying or altering the object of the search;" and (3) the likelihood
that the destruction or alteration will take place.'" Those who advocate
extending the good faith exception to warrantless searches100 would add a
fourth factor for consideration: the nature of the government interest
that may be frustrated by the delay required to obtain a warrant. The
proponents of a good faith exception for· warrantless searches argue that
any delay to obtain a warrant creates some risk of frustrating the search,
and that the risk society is willing to run is colored by the governmental
purpose behind the search. In order to protect privacy, society may be
willing to run a fairly high risk of frustrating the search when the purpose
of the search is merely to obtain incriminating evidence of some minor
crime. Society, however, is willing to run very little risk of frustrating a
search when the purpose of a search is the more significant interest in
preserving life. 101
Chief Justice Burger subscribes to this view and gave an early indication of his position on 'good faith' when sitting on the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. Justice Burger stated the following in
Wayne v. United States: 102 "When policemen, firemen or other public
officers are confronted with evidence which would lead a prudent and reasonable official to see a need to act to protect life or property, they are
authorized to act on that information, even if ultimately found erroneous. "103 Somewhat surprisingly, the Chief Justice did not discuss the relevance of good faith when the opportunity arose in South Dakota v. Opperman. 104 Rather than emphasize the good faith of the officers who
efficiency of administrative machinery for issuing a warrant); People v. Torres, 45 A.D.2d
185, 357 N.Y.S.2d 93 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (difficulty of obtaining warrant on a Saturday
night); Raffield v. State, 333 So. 2d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (difficulty of obtaining
warrant on Christmas Eve).
98. The 'no knock' cases most often deal with the ease with which evidence can be
destroyed. See, e.g., State v. Gassner, 6 Or. App. 452, 488 P.2d 822 (1971). See infra text
accompanying note 127.
99. Most evidence is not self-destructing. But see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966). Thus, the court must assess the likelihood that some party will take affirmstive action to destroy or alter the object of the search. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
100. See supra note 5.
101. This view was expounded in Davis v. State, 236 Md. 389, 204 A.2d 76 (1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 966 (1965). "The delay which would necessarily have resulted from an
application for a search warrant might have been the difference between life and death
. . . . The preservation of human life has been considered paramount to the constitutional
demand of a search warrant as a condition precedent to the invasion of the privacy of a
dwelling house." 236 Md. at 396, 204 A.2d at 80. See also United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d
412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Goldsmith v. United States, 439 U.S. 913 (1978).
102. 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
103. Id. at 212.
104. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
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inventoried an impounded vehicle, the Chief Justice focused on the diminished expectation of privacy in automobiles and decided the case
under the general rubric of reasonableness. 1011 It was left to Justice Powell
to address the warrant requirement in a concurring opinion. 108
Justice Powell identified three purposes served by the warrant requirement, two of which relate to the issue of controlling police misconduct
and the issue of good faith. 107 The first function of a warrant is to insure
that the police officer does not make a discretionary and potentially discriminatory determination to search, thereby substituting his judgment
for that of the magistrate. 108 Justice Powell found that inventory searches
pursuant to uniform and standardized police department procedures insure the good faith (i.e., nondiscriminatory intent) of the searching officer
and thus alleviate the need for a search warrant. 108 The second related
purpose of the warrant requirement is to prevent hindsight and police
perjury 110 from affecting the evaluation of the constitutionality of a
search. 111 Justice Powell found that inventory searches conducted in accordance with routine police department practices insure the good faith
of the searching officer by precluding the opportunity for postsearch perjury by police. m Justice Powell thus employed a doctrine of equivalent
protections, 118 in which case, constitutionality depended on whether the
challenged procedures provided adequate substitute safeguards that compensated for noncompliance with the warrant clause. The standardized
police department regulations in South Dakota v. Opperman insured the
good faith of the searching officers, and thus served the same purpose as
the warrant clause in controlling potential police misconduct. m
105. Id. at 367.
106. Id. at 376 (Powell, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 383-84. The third purpose of a warrant, not relevant here, is that a warrant

communicates to the citizen that the police are acting under lawful authority and sets forth
the lawful limits of the power to search. Id. at 384.
108. Id. at 383.
109. Id.
110. "[A]fter-the-event justification for the ... search [is] too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96
(1964).
111. 428 U.S. at 383.
112. Id.
113. The concept of equivalent protections may have originated in Trupiano v. United
States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) (overruled in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1949)
(overruled in Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969)). Chief Justice Vinson objected

to an insistence "upon the use of a search warrant in situations where the issuance of such a
warrant can contribute nothing to the preservation of the rights which the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect ...." 334 U.S. at 714-15 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
114. There have been numerous suggestions that police department regulations are superior to the exclusionary rule in controlling police conduct. See K. DAVIS, POLICE D1scRET10N
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The Supreme Court, however, has not uniformly allowed good faith or
noble motives to excuse the absence of a warrant. In Payton v. New
York,m the Court enforced the warrant requirement in spite of many law
enforcement agencies' good faith reliance on considerable precedent authorizing a warrantless arrest in a dwelling. 116 The Court in Mincey v.
Arizonam refused to recognize a 'murder scene' exception to the warrant
requirement, despite noble intent to apprehend vicious murderers. 118 The
opinion in South Dakota v. Opperman and the lower court cases addressing searches designed to save lives indicate, however, that police motivation may play a part in determining when the police must obtain a
warrant. 11•

D. Motivation and the Manner of Executing a Search
A search that is lawful at its inception (i.e., the issuance of the warrant
is proper) may become illegal because of the manner in which the search
is executed. 120 The requirement that police give notice before entering the
premises to be searched and the scope and intensity of the search once
the police are properly within the premises are considerations of prime
relevance.
In Ker v. California, 1111 the Supreme Court dealt with the question of
notice prior to entry for purposes of making an arrest. 122 The lower courts
have generally assumed that Ker applies to search warrants. 1118 Except in
those jurisdictions where the magistrate may issue a 'no-knock' warrant,1" the decision to give or dispense with notice is entrusted to the
police officers executing the search warrant. 11111 The officer's decision is not
discretionary, but must be based on the officer's good faith and reasona(1975); McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659 (1972); Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349 (1974).
115. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
116. Id. at 583-603.
117. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
118. Id. at 388-95.
119. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 236 Md. at 395-98, 204 A.2d at 80-82.
120. The discussion in United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), assumed "that the
officers properly executed the warrant ... ."Id. at 3419 n.19.
121. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
.
122. Id. at 37-41.
123. See, e.g., State v. Gassner, 6 Or. App. 452, 488 P.2d 822 (1971).
124. See generally Sonnenreich & Ebner, No-Knock & Nonsense, An Alleged Constitu·
tional Problem, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 626 (1970).
.
125. When police give notice, it raises questions of whether the police have given the
occupant a reasonable opportunity to respond, People v. Abdon, 30 Cal. App. 3d 972, 106
Cal. Rptr. 879 (1972), and whether the police deliberately timed the notice in such a way as
to make a prompt response impossible. United States v. Noreikis, 481 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir.
1973).
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ble assessment that the existing circumstances fit within one of the following recognized exceptions to the notice requirement: (1) the useless
gesture exception; (2) the destruction-of-evidence exception; or (3) the
danger-to-person exception. 116 State v. Gassner, 1117 is illustrative of how
the first two exceptions relate to the issue of police good faith.
In Gassner, the state endeavored to justify an unannounced entry of
the defendant's apartment on grounds that the officer believed the apartment was vacant, Ha or in the alternative, that notice was not required
when police were searching for drugs that could easily be destroyed. 119
Regarding the useless gesture exception, the.court found that the officer's
assumption that he was entering a vacant apartment was unwarranted
under both an objective and subjective standard.130 The officer's belief
failed to meet the objective standard because there were no objective
facts indicating the apartment was vacant. There was also some indication of subjective bad faith "in· the testimony of the apartment manager
that the police plan, before they even went to the apartment, was to just
knock and enter with the pass key."1111
The police officer's concern with the destruction-of-evidence exception
also failed to meet objective and subjective standards. 181 The court summarily rejected the State's rather weak efforts to establish the officer's
subjective belief regarding the destruction of evidence arid accepted the
thrust of the officer's testimony that he was not thinking about potential
destruction at the time of his entry. 183
The court in Gassner also commented upon the wisdom of a 'blanket
rule' in which a court does not require notice whenever the seizable items
are drugs because of the ease with which the evidence can be destroyed. 184
The court stated that such a blanket rule could lead to anomalous results
in which an exception to the constitutional requirement of notice would
totally consume the requirement. m Under a blanket rule, unannounced
entry would be permitted, even though the police were subjectively aware
that the destruction of evidence was impossible. 136 The court also noted
126. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
127. 6 Or. App. 452, 488 P.2d 822 (1971).
128. No ~me was seen entering or leaving; the time of day was as likely to suggest occupancy as vacancy. Id. at 458-59, 488 P.2d at 825.
129. Id. at 458, 488 P.2d at 824-25.
130. Id. at 458-59, 488 P.2d at 825.
131. Id. at 459, 488 P.2d at 825.
132. Id. at 465, 488 P.2d at 828.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 463, 488 P.2d at 827. See, e.g., State v. Loucks, 209 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1973);
State v. Spisak, 520 P.2d 561 (Utah 1974).
135. 6 Or. App. at 463, 488 P.2d at 827.
136. Id. The court cited Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 217 Pa. Super. 432, 272 A.2d 271
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that most jurisdictions had rejected a blanket rule in favor of a requirement that the police officer make a specific showing of the facts warranting a conclusion that destruction of the evidence was likely. 137 The court
in Gassner then adopted a compromise position authorizing unannounced
entries when the officer reasonably believes there is a likelihood of destruction because: (1) The officer has probable cause to believe there is a
small, readily disposable amount of evidence; or (2) the officer, in good
faith, does not know the amount. 118 The court found a lack of a subjective
and reasonable belief on the part of the searching officer because the officer was subjectively aware that the drugs to be seized were of a sufficient quantity to preclude rapid destruction. 189
The danger-to-person exception to the notice requirement does not
raise any questions distinct from the destruction-of-evidence exception.
In People v. Dumas, 140 the court considered whether to apply a blanket
rule to situations in which the police reasonably believe the suspect to be
in possession of a weapon.m As in Gassner, the court in Dumas rejected
a blanket rule and required that police officers demonstrate a reasonable
belief "based on specific facts and not on broad unsupported presumptions"1'1 that a weapon will be used against them if they give notice. 148
Likewise in Tatman v. State, 14' the court found only an unsupported assertion of fear that defendant might have a weapon and thus found a lack
of support for a 'good faith belief on the part of the police officers. 140
Courts in these cases rejecting blanket rules to justify no-knock entries
have engaged in an examination of police good faith. The officer's belief
that the circumstances justify a no-knock entry must be both genuine
(good faith belieO and objectively reasonable (supported by specific
facts). The officer's good faith is also relevant in assessing the reasonableness of the search actually carried out after a lawful entry. 1' 6
"As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer
(1970), in which the police made an unannounced search for five pounds of marijuana in a
third-floor college dormitory room, knowing that the room contained no toilet, and knowing
there were no means of escape other than the one door they entered. Id. at 433-34, 272 A.2d
at 272.
137. 6 Or. App. at 462, 488 P.2d at 827-28. See, e.g., People v. Gastelo, 67 Cal. 2d 586,
432 P.2d 706, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1967).
138. 6 Or. App. at 464, 488 P.2d at 827-28.
139. Id. at 464, 488 P.2d at 828. The seized drugs were 1,000 Benzedrine pills.
140. 9 Cal. 3d 871, 512 P.2d 1208, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304 ~1973).
141. Id. at 878-79, 512 P.2d at 1213-14, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 309-10.
142. Id. at 879, 512 P.2d at 1213, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
143. Id. at 878-79, 512 P.2d at 1213, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
144. 320 A.2d 750 (Del. 1974).
145. Id. at 751.
146. Id.
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executing the warrant.''147 The command of the fourth amendment that
warrants particularly describe the items to be seized 148 was intended to
prevent the type of police misconduct historically associated with general
warrants. 149 The statement that nothing is left to the discretion of the
officer is an overstatement though, because a lawful search may be as intense as is reasonably necessary to find the items described in the
warrant.
It is difficult to imagine that a case could arise where an offir..er executing

a valid search warrant would not at some stage in the matter be required
in the very nature of things to exercise his judgment as to what thing or
things . . . were to be seized under the warrant. 150

When a police officer executes a warrant, the officer's judgment must be
objectively reasonable, and subjectively the officer must execute the warrant in good faith. Consequently, courts will not permit a search for stolen automobile tires to extend to the top shelf of a closet because the
searching officer could not reasonably believe that the tires were located
in such a small place. m In order to avoid general warrants, 11111 a search
"must be directed in good faith toward finding the objects described in
the search warrant . . . ." 1118 The searching officer's motivation or reason
for searching an area is thus a necessary consideration in determining the
proper scope of a lawful search.

E. Motivation and Third-Party Consent
The above discussion of police motivation and the fourth amendment
demonstrates that police motivation or purpose is at times a relevant consideration in determining the constitutionality of a search. There is, however, no large body of precedent that indicates a ringing endorsement for
utilizing police good faith as a constitutional consideration because most
147. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
148. The fourth amendment provides that the warrant "particularly [describe] the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized," U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
149. See supra text accompanying note 16. To allow a search for items not specified in
the search warrant "would come perilously close to reviving the long discredited general
warrant." United States v. Sanchez, 509 F.2d 886, 890 (6th Cir. 1975).
150. Strauss v. Stynchcombe, 224 Ga. 859, 866, 165 S.E.2d 302, 307 (1968).
151. United States v. Chadwell, 427 F. Supp. 692, 696 (D. Del. 1977). Compare Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258, 312 A.2d 29, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1973), with United
States v. Johnson, 475 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
152. See supra text accompanying note 16.
153. State v. Watkins, 89 S.D. 661, 665, 237 N.W.2d 14, 16 (1975) (search warrant for
stolen goods held to be a mere pretext for a full-scale drug raid) (overruled in State v.
Kaseman, 273 N.W.2d 716,.722 (S.D. 1978)). See also United States v. Tranquillo, 330 F.
Supp. 871, 876 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
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of the Supreme Court's recognition of police motivation has been tangential or covert. This lack of precedent is particularly true in the area of
third-party consent. The Court declined an opportunity to rule upon police good faith and third-party consent when the issue was squarely
presented in United States v. Matlock. m In Matlock the government argued that police could legitimately accept consent to search from a third
person with 'apparent' authority to authorize a· search. 1 11& The concept of
apparent authority focuses on the facts as they reasonably appear to the
police officer, even if unknown facts ultimately show that the third party
lacked actual authority to consent to a search. 158 Under the facts in Matlock, however, the Court found actual authority and, thus, declined consideration of the government's theory of apparent authority. 1117
In contrast, the Court may have given recognition, albeit implicit recognition, to police good faith in another third-party consent case. In Frazier
v. Cupp,1 66 the police searched defendant's duffel bag after acquiring the
consent of defendant's cousin, Rawls, who shared the use of the bag. 1611
Defendant argued that Rawls had actual permission to use only one compartment of the bag and had no authority to consent to a search of the
other compartments. 180 The Court declined to "engage in such metaphysical subtleties" and held that defendant "must be taken to have assumed
the risk that Rawls would allow someone else to look inside." 181 The
Court's invocation of the assumption of the risk doctrine makes little
sense from the perspective of the defendant's subjective state of mind
(i.e., voluntary consent). The Court failed to explain why a defendant assumes the risk that a cousin will consent to a search of a duffel bag when
a defendant does not assume the risk, for example, that a hotel clerk will
consent to a search of the defendant's room, as in Stoner v. California. 1 &1&
The Court's use of assumption of risk analysis in Frazier 163 makes sense
only if the facts are viewed from the perspective of the police officer's
state of mind. The police may reasonably be charged with knowledge that
hotel clerks lack authority to consent to searches· of occupied hotel rooms,
but the police cannot reasonably be charged with knowledge of secret and
'metaphysical' divisions of authority over compartments of a duffel bag.
The holding in Frazier is proper and distinguishable from Stoner only if
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

415 U.S. 164 (1974).
Id. at 167-69.
Id. at 171 n.7.
Id. at 175-78.
394 U.S. 731 (1969).
Id. at 740.
Id.
Id.
376 U.S. 483 (1964).
394 U.S. at 740.
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the Court implicitly recognized police good faith as a relevant consideration in assessing the constitutionality of third-party consent searches. In
third-party consent cases, as in the other areas discussed, police motivation continues to play some undefined role in fourth amendment
jurisprudence.
II.

CONCLUSION

Justice White suggested an alternative approach to the good faith question in his concilrring opinion in Illinois v. Gates, 1114 in which he expressed the view that the operation of the exclusionary rule and the question of good faith should not be divorced from substantive fourth
amendment law. 186 Unfortunately, Justice White abandoned this view in
United States v. Leon 1116 and adopted the majority's position in Gates
that the remedy of exclusion is separate from the question of substantive
fourth amendment rights. 1417 Had· Justice White retained his goal of integrating the exclusionary rule and the good faith exception into the full
body of fourth amendment jurisprudence, he could have used a consistent
approach in Gates and Leon. The Court in Gates abandoned the rigid
rules of Aguilar v. Texas 168 in favor of a more flexible totality of the circumstances test. 1. . Instead of formulating a rigid rule on good faith in its
decision in Leon, the Court should have shown the same preference for
the flexibility inherent in an examination of the totality of the
circumstances.
The Court should recognize that police good faith is but one of the
circumstances affecting the application of the exclusionary rule. The remedy of exclusion, like the determination of substantive fourth amendment
rights, is best addressed by balancing all of the relevant circumstances.
The flexibility inherent in a totality of the circumstances test allows the
Court to attach some unspecified weight to police motivation, instead of
being forced to Leon's all-or-nothing decision on good faith.1 7 ° For exam164. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
165. "(T]he scope of the exclusionary rule cannot be divorced from the Fourth Amendment . . . . (T]he issues surrounding a proposed good faith exception are intricately and
inseverably tied to the nature of the Fourth Amendment violation ...." Id. at 249 (White,
J., concurring).
166. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
167. "Whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case,
our decisions make clear, is 'an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth
Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.'"
Id. at 3412 (1984) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 223).
168. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
169. 104 S. Ct. at 3411 n.5.
170. See supra text accompanying note 3.
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pie, a flexible balancing approach would permit the Court to find that
certain invasions of privacy are deemed so serious (e.g., a seizure of a
personal diary) that even reasonable mistakes cannot be tolerated. Under
a flexible balancing approach to the application of the exclusionary rule,
the weight accorded police motivation would be deliberately left ambiguous, just as it remains ambiguous in other fourth amendment areas. Although 'bright line' clarity is sacrificed under such an approach, recognizing police good faith as one relevant factor in the totality of
circumstances is consistent with the Court's overall balancing approach to
fourth amendment jurisprudence.
III.

EPILOGUE

Fourth Amendment Cliches: A Tongue-in-Cheek Look at the Good
Faith Exception
'Tho boys throw stones at frogs in jest, the frogs do not die in jest but
in earnest.' The United States Supreme Court ignored this old maxim on
motivation and recently hurled some fatal stones at the fourth amendment. The Court's adoption of the good faith exception in United States
v. Leon 171 adds nothing new to an understanding of fourth amendment
jurisprudence, but merely recites some rather tired cliches. We may now
be entering an era when search and seizure cases are decided, not by reasoned analysis, but by invocation of handy cliches. The reader can test
his or her ability at this new form of fourth amendment practice by answering the following quiz and comparing his or her responses with the
best and worst answers as scored by the Supreme Court.
1) The road to hell is paved with good
intentions.
2) The end justifies the means.
3) Ignorance of the law is no excuse.
4) What you don't know can't hurt you.
5) The buck stops here. .
6) What you see is what you get.
7) It doesn't count if you don't mean it.
8) Work expands to fill the time available.
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1) The road to hell is paved with good intentions. The correct answer
is False. It is the road to admission of illegally seized evidence that is
paved with good intentions. The good faith exception recognizes police
motivation as the sine qua non of the exclusionary rule. In other words,
171. 104 S. Ct. at 3405.
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the exclusionary rule exists to deter police misconduct, and there can be
no misconduct when the police make reasonable good faith efforts to
comply with the fourth amendment by obtaining a search warrant. Worst
answer-The good faith exception is inadequate because it assumes that
the exclusionary rule exists only to address deliberate police misconduct.
Totally ignored is the exclusionary rule's objective of educating the police
about lawful searches so that a citizen's right to privacy will be intruded
upon only when the constitutional requirement of probable cause is met.
2) The end justifies the means. True. Legal technicalities such as constitutional rights cannot stand in the way of effective law enforcement.
The 'first' principle of fourth amendment interpretation is that the con.stitutional standard must be "workable for application by rank and file,
trained police officers." 171 Worst answer-'No man is above the law.' Law
enforcement officials have a responsibility to know and obey the law, even
· when they act upon noble intent to apprehend law breakers.
3) Ignorance of the law is no excuse. The correct answer is true for
criminal defendants; false for police officers. Worst answer-The good
faith exception encourages police to remain ignorant of the constitutional
standards for proper searches. (See question (4) below).
4) What you don't know can't hurt you. The correct answer is true.
Worst answer-The conscientious law enforcement officer who seeks to
comply with constitutional requirements is at a disadvantage. If he recognizes that probable cause is lacking, he will have to continue his investigation until adequate facts are developed. The officer who is ignorant of
constitutional standards will see probable cause lurking behind every
tree. The officer has nothing to lose and everything to gain when he submits inadequate information to a magistrate who is equally ignorant of
probable cause requirements.
5) The buck stops here. False. The police have no responsibility to
make a correct determination of probable cause, but may pass the buck
to the magistrate. (Extra credit if the officer spouts another cliche: 'It's
not my job.') Worst answer-In the area of warrantless searches the
Court has recognized that the police may substitute their determination
of probable cause for the judgment of a magistrate. Given this power (and
presumed knowledge) to recognize when probable cause is present, the
police should have the concomitant responsibility (and knowledge) to recognize when probable cause is lacking.
6) What you see is what you get. The correct answer is false. If the
magistrate accepts an affidavit to search for seizable item X, but issues a
warrant for seizable item Z, the police may search for X.173 The police
172. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 772 (1983).
173. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984).
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need not read the warrant to see if they got what they asked for. Worst
answer-It is not an unconscionable burden to require police to read the
warrant they plan to execute.
7) It doesn't count if you don't mean it. True. Citizens will forgive
violations of their privacy so long as the offending officer did not intentionally violate the citizen's constitutional rights. Extra credit for: 'I'll
still respect you in the morning.' Worst answer-"Experience should
teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent.''174
8) Work expands to fill the time available. The best answer is true.
The judiciary in this country has too much time on its hands and will
welcome the opportunity to render advisory opinions on unconstitutional
searches even though the opinion has no effect on the case before the
bench. Worst answer-Courts do not generally render advisory opinions,
and overburdened courts will regard the constitutionality of the search as
a moot point whenever the good faith exception applies. Fourth amendment law, thus, will stagnate because the police may reasonably rely on
existing law and cannot be required to anticipate future developments
defining illegal searches.
It may take some time to become comfortable with this new form of
litigation by cliche, but it does have advantages. Justice Rehnquist once
observed: "Very little that has been said in our previous decisions . . .
and very little that we might say here can usefully refine the language of
the [Fourth] Amendment itself in order to evolve some detailed formula
for judging cases such as this.'' 1111 Nonetheless, the average search and
seizure case takes little more than twice as many pages as the average of
all cases decided by the Supreme Court. These lengthy discourses have
wasted a great deal of paper and endangered our national forests.
Thousands of trees will be spared when counsel can utilize a short hand
method of argument by cliche, and even more trees will be saved when
the Court can limit its opinion to that most comprehensive of all
cliches: 'I know it when I see it.'

174. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (overruled in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967)).
175. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448 (1973).

